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Introduction 
Autumn comes quickly to the High Sierra. At 8,500 feet above sea level, the 
long, warm days of summer give way to crisp mornings, long shadows, and 
the first flurries of snow on the ridges and peaks. There are huge swaths of 
isolated terrain here, even in the summer; but after Labor Day the crowds 
really begin to thin, and after the equinox one can find deep silence and 
solitude in the hushed diminuendo before the long silence of winter. In this 
transitional period one finds the Sierra at its finest, its dappled landscape a 
sweeping testament to Donne’s contention that “in heaven it is always 
autumn.”1 
Early one morning, in the autumn of 1995, I hiked alone into the 
Cathedral Range, just south of Tuolumne Meadows, an area dotted with 
moderate peaks. Over the course of the day I climbed and traversed over a 
dozen distinct summits, spires, and ridges before turning north again and 
hiking out to the road. With nothing other than a small daypack to hold my 
climbing shoes and some water, now long gone, my body glided lightly over 
the trail, weaving in and out of Sierra lodgepole, alongside a stream drawn 
down by the summer, and across granite slabs shining with glacial polish. 
As the trees thinned approaching the meadow I slowed down so as to 
prolong the moment; my body flushed with the radiance of exertion, which 
was mirrored by the rosy alpenglow on the granite domes and, in the 
distance, on the summit of Mt. Conness. Minutes later, arriving at the road 
in the waning light, a lone car sped past me heading east into the dusk and 
the long descent into Owens Valley. The noise of the engine, rising and 
falling with the Doppler shift, was not exactly jarring, but incongruous; it 
pulled me from one world into another, as if waking from a dream or 
reverie. 
Later that evening, camped with a murmuring creek at my feet and the 
brilliant river of the Milky Way above my head, I thought about the 
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experience. I realized that while I’d been on the move for many hours, 
hiking and climbing thousands of feet of moderately technical ground, what 
stood out was not a clear, linear narrative of the events of the day. My 
recollection was rather the feeling of deep connection to the place and with 
the moment, an intimate experience of my body engaged with the terrain, 
and a kind of global sensuous experience of the environment. True, in 
retrospect I could, and did, frame the events in a narrative, intoning the 
names of the peaks I’d climbed and the topographic contours I’d followed to 
enchain the summits. Likewise, I could abstract and recollect individual 
scents, sounds, or sights that had been part of my immersion in the 
environment. However, that narrative sequence and those abstract sensory 
elements were not what I had actually experienced during most of the day.  
The difference was more than that between reflecting on the activity 
and engaging in the activity, though that was certainly part of it. During the 
day I had, for awhile, been more deeply immersed in and connected with 
the world than was the case on either rest-days or on other, more substantial 
climbing routes that occupied me that summer.2 I’d experienced this before: 
on the polished floor of a dojo in Japan; gliding across the face of a wave in 
Indonesia; carving long turns on skis deep in the San Juan Mountains. 
Different places, different moments, but always the same kind of experience: 
thoroughly engaged but somehow effortless, wholly aware, deeply carnal, 
and fully alive. And always the same feelings: joy, wonder, connection to a 
particular place, the sufficiency of the moment, and a deep appreciation of 
and gratitude for the gift of life and the goodness of being. 
In what follows, I want to reflect on these and similar experiences, 
which I will call examples of vitality. Such experiences are neither 
idiosyncratic (they overlap with major themes in Chinese philosophy, 
among other disciplines) nor mere romanticism (contemporary psychology 
lends credence to these accounts). Moreover, the work of French philosopher 
Michel Serres suggests the relevance of this issue for a variety of 
philosophical topics.  
Nevertheless, vital experience has received relatively little attention 
from philosophers. The reasons for this lacuna are, no doubt, complex; but 
they are not entirely surprising. Academics are for the most part intellectual 
creatures. And if continental philosophy has laid to rest Cartesian dualism 
with the rise of existential phenomenology and hermeneutics, the news 
seems not to have reached a great many philosophers. We academics, after 
all, live the “life of the mind.” And for many, if the body is not quite a 
prison-house3 it remains something of secondary interest. I’m not suggesting 
that no continental philosophers address embodiment; Merleau-Ponty, 
Deleuze, Nancy, Chretien, and Falque, among others, complicate the picture. 
However, “there is no denying that the linguistic turn to the text was often 
construed as a turning away from the flesh—in practice if not in principle.”4 
Moreover, while some continental figures address the body—as perceiving, 
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as sexed, as political—there has been almost no attention given to the active 
body of vitality. 
 
The Experience of Vitality  
One way to get at vitality would be to begin with more well-known accounts 
with which it shares characteristics: Abraham Maslow’s notion of “peak 
experience,”5 Mihaly Ciskszentmihalyi’s account of “flow,”6 the Taoist 
concept of wu-wei,7 and related Japanese adaptations of Tao in various dō 
(ways). What all these concepts have in common—not to conflate them or 
engage in reductivism—is a way of being in the world in which action flows 
effectively but without conscious effort and, as a consequence, one has the 
feeling of “naturalness.” To achieve this state, it is, paradoxically, essential 
not to try, to let go. Of course, just exactly how one is supposed to achieve 
success through “trying not to try” is a vexing question, and different 
accounts offer different sorts of advice.8  
But the flow of solving a mathematical proof and the flow of consuming 
an excellent meal are not quite the same; and the flow of trail running in the 
foothills near my home is, despite similarities to the first two cases, different 
again. Each of these activities leads to a different sort of experience, even if 
all are done with wu-wei or flow. “Vitality,” then, is a subcategory of flow or 
wu-wei that is distinguished by, among other things, a particular sort of 
active and bodily engagement with the world. It is not alien to flow, but a 
specific manifestation of it.  
Of course, the body can never be fully disengaged from any activity. We 
are embodied beings and there is a somatic component to all the 
multifarious aspects of our being, down to our thinking, knowing, 
perceiving, and interpreting. From vigorous physical exertion to seemingly 
passive endeavors such as the appreciation of visual art or music, the body 
remains the inescapable “background” against which all our various modes 
of being unfold.9 But while the body is always engaged, it is easier to 
experience vitality—the bodily engagement of flow—in some activities and 
more difficult, often much more difficult, in others.  
 
Hermeneutics and Empiricism: The Curious Case of Michel 
Serres 
Philosophy has not been entirely indifferent to vitality. Michel Serres’s 
idiosyncratic and challenging work touches, in several places, on the topic.10 
This is, perhaps, because Serres’s own life has been lived with a commitment 
to both the active life and the life of the mind: “No seated professor taught 
me productive work; the only kind of any worth, whereas my gymnastics 
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teachers, coaches and, later, my guides inscribed its very conditions into my 
muscles and bones.”11  
This commitment to both the body and the mind attunes Serres to the 
phenomenon I am calling vitality. He recounts “rare” occasions when, 
climbing or otherwise engaged in vigorous activity, he became surprised by 
a “physically supernatural joy” in which “life superlives”12:  
I was suddenly inundated, filled, saturated, satiated, flooded over, 
thunderstruck with such lofty elation, continuous and sovereign, 
that I thought my chest was bursting, that my entire body was 
levitating, present in all the space of the world entire present in me. 
Pleroma of exaltation. There was nothing artificial in that 
experience, since it occurred at times when I was eating little and 
drinking only water, and since all my attention, nervous and 
muscular, was required so as not to fall: thus the ecstasy arose 
during an active period when reality, hard, was mobilizing the 
entire body.13 
This, it seems to me, is a textbook account of the experience of vitality. The 
activity mobilized his entire being. Serres describes his body, nervous and 
muscular, cognitive (but not abstract or analytical) and carnal, absorbed in 
the task. That task involved intimate interaction with what Serres calls “the 
hard” (le dur)—the primary, sensuous, material givenness of reality. The 
experience was both a kind of self-transcending—ecstasy (ek-stasis), 
“pleroma of exultation”—and, at the same time, a kind of grounding: 
“present in all the space of the world entire present in me.” Finally, he was 
not fully in control; the experience came upon him: he was “inundated, 
saturated… flooded over, thunderstruck.”  
But while Serres offers us a philosophically serious treatment of 
something like vitality, he remains an intriguing foil for a hermeneutics of the 
carnal body. On the one hand, his work considers the body through its 
senses, activities, and relations—all as part of a larger philosophical itinerary 
deeply engaged with the figure of Hermes.14 For Serres, Hermes is the agent 
or operator that facilitates rapprochement, the bringing together of seemingly 
incommensurable discourses to bear on a topic of interest, making 
connections, building relationships, explicating, and creating.15 Yet alongside 
this allegiance to Hermes, Serres exhibits a pronounced distrust—
manifestations of which range from disinterested to prickly to outright 
hostile—for philosophies of language, for phenomenology, and for the 
hermeneutics of critique and suspicion.16 Thus, in Serres’s work we find 
Hermes but not hermeneutics, or at least not hermeneutics as we’ve come to 
recognize it.  
This general suspicion of language is a manifestation of Serres’s 
commitment to realism, materialism, and empiricism. His early studies were 
in mathematics, and he maintained an abiding interest in the sciences. Even 
2 0 4  |  V i t a l i t y  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXV, No 1 (2017)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2017.803 
when he turned to literature and philosophy, his interests left him isolated 
from the mainstream philosophical trends of his youth.17 In a generation 
increasingly fascinated with the constructed nature of reality, Serres’s 
intellectual commitments left him an unapologetic realist: 
Without being able to prove it I believe, like soothsayers and 
haruspices, and like scientists, that there exists a world 
independent of men. No one knows how to demonstrate the truth 
of this proposition, which we might like to call realist, since it 
exceeds language and thus any utterance which might demonstrate 
its proof. [However,] realism is worth betting on, whereas idealism 
calls for demonstration.18 
For Serres, realism requires—though is not captured solely by—a good 
dose of empiricism. Although we can “make do without empiricism,”19 we 
do so at the cost of carnal, sensuous life: “I don’t believe that if there is any 
sense to life, it lies in the word life; it rather… arises in the senses of the 
living body.”20 Sensation via language is the idiom of “statues”: figures built 
by philosophers, detached from sensuous, carnal, vital life, whose 
experience is systematic, analytic, more dead than alive.21 Such effigies have 
fundamentally different experiences:  
Garden or boarding school? A fork in the road of child-rearing… 
If you wish to train an army of statues socially dedicated to the 
struggle for dominance, give them a poor, dry lexicon, as hard as 
wood and as cold as iron, studded with technical jargon like an 
endless refrain, form their senses through these words, give them 
access to the given through this language… As they begin their 
existence, children will shield their eyes when they raise them 
towards the patch of sky visible at the top of the well shaft which is 
their school-prison… 
If [rather] you form their words through the senses, amidst the 
hawthorn and primrose, if rose, in all its declensions, can be related 
to the exploding, fragrant bouquet of shapes and hues, if you build 
their language through the given, then anything can happen. Even 
a poet. Even a happy adult; even a wise one….22 
Provocative stuff. Sure to raise the ire of hermeneutic philosophers focused 
on “texts.” However, Serres’s work is not, I’ll contend, quite as allergic to the 
phenomenological and hermeneutic project as it might appear at first blush. 
He confesses that he is not interested in following certain contemporary 
philosophical movements, and is therefore ignorant regarding certain details 
of their development.23 This leads, I believe, to a critique of phenomenology 
and hermeneutics that paints with too broad a brush. Nevertheless it is very 
difficult not to take seriously his point about the life of the academic and the 
nature of professional philosophy. The oddity of reflecting on life rather 
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than living it is the source of myriad comic stereotypes of the academy: too 
much phenomenology, not enough perception; too much reflection, not 
enough experience. The unlived life is not worthy of examination.  
I want to suggest that it would be useful to think of Serres as a kind of 
“hermeneutic empiricist,” and that explicitly developing such a position is 
an important task, and that vitality and related experiences are an 
instructive example for this approach. This approach is “hermeneutic” 
insofar as, taking Hermes as a guide, it foregrounds the significance of 
interpretation—conceived broadly to include perspective, bodily orientation, 
and similar examples of filtered or mediated experience—in understanding 
both our way of knowing and our way of being in the world. Such a 
broadened conception is one way of speaking about what I have come to 
think of as hermeneutics “beyond the metaphor of the text,” an approach 
committed to uncovering and understanding the various modulations, 
translations, and transformations that our experience and knowledge 
undergo as they traverse the folded and variegated landscape of what Serres 
calls “mixed reality.” This approach would be “empirical” in the 
etymological and original sense of a form of knowledge that is grounded in 
experience (empeiría), especially our embodied and sensuous experience of 
“hard” reality. Our primary engagement with reality—primary taken here 
as “first,” “omnipresent,” and “most fundamental”—is our carnal, 
embodied, sensuous experience of reality.24  
 
Carnal Seraphim: The Body as Mediator and Messenger  
Hermes, as is well known, is the patron of hermeneutics—the god of speech, 
writing, and eloquence, but also the god of travel, exchange, invention, and 
translation. Hermes’s trade involves travel, from place to place and from 
idiom to idiom, which for Serres largely means travel between science and 
the social or human sciences in a way that results in a “general theory of 
relations.”25 His emphasis is less on the translation from one language to the 
other and more on the relationship forged between two spheres in the 
process of traveling back and forth between them. It’s not a matter of re-
stating, philosophically, what science says about its subject matter. Nor of 
philosophy (or the humanities more broadly) serving as a mere town crier or 
press secretary for the truth that science reveals.26 It is, rather, a way of 
considering what is captured and what is missed by, respectively, science, 
social science, the humanities, and even by various combinations and 
encounters between all three.27 
Hermes has an ally in this work. Angels, Serres points out, are also 
fundamentally messengers (angělǒs: messenger or envoy), and therefore 
perform a similar function. They too translate or transport. They are 
messengers between different worlds: traversing the heavenly spheres, 
2 0 6  |  V i t a l i t y  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXV, No 1 (2017)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2017.803 
translating between different idioms, both icons of difference and metaphors 
for bridging differences. Christianity tends to construe angels as purely 
spiritual beings, but in doing so we miss the sort of polyvalence to which 
Rilke’s eyes and ears were so finely attuned.28 Their role as messengers 
enables them to cross freely between transcendence and immanence: they 
are beings who wrestle (Genesis 32: 24-39), who feed others (1 Kings 19:4-8), 
and who, most dramatically, embrace and touch in a manner that is 
distinctly carnal and sensuous (captured vividly in the works of St. Teresa, 
and in Bernini’s depiction of her ecstasies).29 The glory of angels is immanent 
as well as transcendent, and recognizing this carnal aspect Serres often 
describes the human body as angelic.30 Here he allies himself with Hamlet: “in 
action”—not disembodied reason, not imagination—“how like an angel.” In 
“apprehension”—which is first and foremost our primary, sensuous 
perception or grasp of something (from the Latin “to seize,” ad-prehendere), 
rather than calculated reflection or argument—“how like a god.”31 The flesh, 
mysterious, “participates in divinity.”32  
How is the body angelic? It occupies a privileged place in which the 
hard (le dur) and the soft (le doux) intersect, exchange, comingle, and 
catalyze.33 The hard is the given: the physical and material world; reality 
independent of human perception of it; reality “as if I were dead”34; the 
“inhuman” cosmos.35 The soft, in contrast, is the sphere of culture, language, 
signs, and more generally human accounts of reality. As angelic, the body 
mediates between the hard and the soft, nature and culture, material reality 
and language: transmitting, transgressing, translating, and transfiguring. 
But, more than this, the body actually helps to effect the process by which 
the hard becomes soft and, perhaps more surprisingly, the soft becomes 
hard. 
The body is one example of what Serres calls a “black box,” a 
mysterious arrangement that carries out transformations from the hard to 
the soft. Hard reality comes in one side of the box, and soft concepts come 
out the other:  
The box transforms the world into coloured pictures, into paintings 
hanging on walls, changes the landscape into tapestry, the city into 
abstract compositions. Its function is to replace the sun with heaters 
and the world with icons. The sound of the wind with gentle 
words.36 
That we tend to soften the hard is, I suspect, unsurprising. Continental 
philosophy has long been fascinated with the ways in which we contribute 
to the “creation” of the world. The lifeworld (Lebenswelt) is the dynamic, 
horizonal background of all possible experience37, and this background is 
hermeneutically structured in certain ways by signs, symbols, metaphors, 
and narratives, as well as reason. 
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However, carnal hermeneutics illustrates that translation and 
transformation between the hard and the soft happens in a variety of 
different ways.38 The black box of the body is not a unidirectional system 
with a single operation: the transformation of the hard to the soft; it 
accomplishes the transmutation of the soft to the hard as well. It is true that 
we “soften” reality, which takes its most problematic form when we take 
various sorts of abstractions from reality to be reality itself39; but we also 
“harden” reality any time a person has an idea or concept (soft) and, based 
on that idea, constructs or otherwise alters hard reality. Take, for example, 
the complex transformations—both hardening and softening—associated 
with cuisine. The hard reality of nature (e.g., chicken, wine, mushrooms, 
garlic, herbs) becomes an expression of culture (e.g., coq au vin) and, 
simultaneously, the soft idea of a culture (e.g., “Frenchness”) becomes 
manifest in hard reality.  
But we must be careful, because talk of “the” hard and “the” soft might 
suggest we are reinstating metaphysical dualism or engaging in a facile sort 
of binary thinking. As I’ve made clear elsewhere, the purely hard and the 
purely soft are nowhere to be found; we have, rather, degrees on a spectrum 
of hardness and softness.40 Nevertheless, we should not abandon the 
language of the hard and the soft because it is rhetorically, didactically, and 
philosophically useful.  
The laptop computer on which I type these words and the lemon tree 
outside my window are both made up of the same stardust which comprises 
my own body, and so there are good reasons to recognize that we have no 
grounds for calling some of these objects “natural” and others “unnatural.” 
Yet “natural” and “unnatural” remain useful and appropriate descriptors for 
helping us to distinguish between a wide variety of objects, phenomena, and 
actions. Similarly, it remains useful, even essential, to recognize aspects, 
parts, or experiences of that reality as either harder (reality imposed on us, 
reality to which we must conform, reality “as if we were dead,” and so on) 
or softer (meaningful reality, experienced reality, reality ‘while we are here’ 
and ‘with which we are involved’), all the while recognizing that there is 
only one reality. 
The black box filters both the hard and the soft without blind allegiance 
to either. Its functions are both carnal and hermeneutic; or, better, its 
hermeneutic functions are carnal, and its carnality is hermeneutic. This is 
appropriate given that we encounter not the purely hard or purely soft, but 
rather various sorts of “mixed reality.”  
 
The Black Box of Vitality   
The body is always engaged, and interpretation of some sort is always going 
on, but this is not to say that the operations of the black box unfold in a 
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uniform manner in all of the body’s various activities and engagements with 
the world. Different activities, and different ways of conducting similar 
activities, engage the body in different ways.41  
Flow and wu-wei reveal certain truths about the world and our 
experience of it, and vitality—the type of flow characterized by active, carnal 
engagement with the material world—reveals certain of these truths in an 
exemplary manner. Vitality connects us with cords—to use another of 
Serres’s tropes—to both soft relations and hard reality.42 It is a form of carnal 
hermeneutics that constitutes, as it were, a specific configuration of settings 
for the operations of the black box; the box retains its general function, but 
vitality accomplishes these transformations in unique ways. 
(a) Undifferentiated Sensation  
Flow, wu-wei, and vitality illustrate the degree to which our primary 
sensuous experience is undifferentiated. That is to say, the degree to which 
our primary experience of the world is sensuous experience, understood 
globally or comprehensively, prior to being broken up into the experience of 
sights, sounds, smells, textures, and tastes. Reality is mixed, and that is how 
we experience it prior to a moment of reflection or rupture that causes us to 
focus on some particular ingredient of reality or our experience of it. 
Take, for example, the experience of taste, which is perhaps the most 
obviously synesthetic or conesthetic of the senses. When “tasting,” it is 
almost impossible to disentangle taste, smell, and touch; the flavor, the 
aromas, and the texture are more or less indistinguishable in our primary 
experience. To say that we taste food—if by “taste” we mean something 
qualitatively different from smell, touch, and so forth—is at best an 
abstraction, a selective filtering of a more global or comprehensive 
experience as it moves through the black box. Such abstraction can serve a 
purpose, as when an oenophile wants to describe the complexity of oak, 
berries, or tobacco she smells in the aroma of a Bordeaux from the body of 
the wine she feels once she takes a sip; but that same abstraction is 
misleading if it is taken to express a primary perception of the world via 
independent and easily distinguishable tools or techniques—taste, smell, 
touch—that we apply as we reach out and encounter an external and wholly 
independent object.  
Taste, of course, is merely a telling example. Undifferentiated 
perception is ultimately at the root of all our experience of the world, as 
Merleau-Ponty, Richard Shusterman, and others have pointed out.43 Our 
initial immersion in the world does not distinguish between the five classical 
senses. But the fact is that we often miss this primary unity of experience 
because reflection tends to break it into constituent parts for purposes of 
emphasis or analysis, which can, it must be said, prove both illuminating 
and useful. However, precisely as a consequence of that utility, we are apt to 
overlook or forget the significance of our primary immersion in the world.  
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Our undifferentiated, global immersion is inescapable, and least able to 
be ignored, in experiences of vitality. In such cases, as Serres and other 
testify, the “entire body” is “inundated, filled, saturated, satiated, flooded 
over.” It is precisely the absorbing nature of vital experience, experienced as 
an inescapable imposition, that prevents us from focusing on a single 
sense—as might occur when the oenophile first looks for clarity, then smells 
for bouquet, and so on—revealing our primary, global, sensuous experience. 
In vitality, the mode of engagement with the world is pre-reflective, pre-
analytic, and pre-skeptical. 
(b) A World 
The global nature of primordial experience is not only evident in 
perception, but in the perceived as well; and flow, wu-wei, and vitality are, 
again, the clearest testament to this. Rather than giving us discrete 
phenomena—a fact about, or slice of the world—vitality delivers us over to a 
complete world.  
Consider, by way of analogy, Proust’s account of voluntary and 
involuntary memory, famously captured in his account of a madeleine 
dipped in tea, a stumble on the cobblestones outside the Guermantes’s 
mansion, and similar experiences. Voluntary memory is accomplished 
through conscious effort and brings to mind discrete facts, images, or events. 
Involuntary memory—the sort of memory awakened by the madeleine—
operates not by conscious effort but rather by letting go, just as in wu-wei and 
vitality. And it delivers not discrete phenomena but an entire world (e.g., 
one’s childhood home in Combray, or the baptistery of St. Mark’s in Venice). 
Rather than the resistance we experience in the effort of conscious memory, 
involuntary memory is experienced naturally and spontaneously, without 
effort. The experience is one of the mind being “overtaken” and of an 
“essence” being “called into being.”44  
With respect to his stumble on the cobblestones of Guermantes Way, 
Proust states explicitly the power of involuntary memory to restore an entire 
world:  
Almost at once I recognized the vision: it was Venice, of which my 
effort to describe it and the supposed snapshots taken by my 
memory had never told me anything, but which the sensation 
which I had once experienced as I stood on two uneven stones in 
the baptistery of St. Mark’s had, recurring a moment ago 
[stumbling outside the Guermantes mansion], restored to me 
complete with all the other sensations linked on that day to that particular 
sensation, all of which had been waiting in their place—from which 
with imperious suddenness a chance happening had caused them 
to emerge—in the series of forgotten days.45 
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In such instances, memory imposes itself upon us, rather than being called 
into being in a narrative structured, consciously or unconsciously, by our 
will. The experience is “indisputable.”46  
In a parallel manner, the experience of vitality delivers over the entire 
world of some particular place, not one of imagination or memory but one of 
active, engaged, carnal experience in the present moment. And like 
involuntary memory, vitality connects us not to a component, object, or 
sensation in the world, or even to a combination of objects, but to the world 
itself. Here too, we find ourselves overtaken by the experience, caught up in 
the “flow,” rather than directing the experience. Even if we can describe and 
analyze it—phenomenologically, psychologically, physiologically, and so 
forth—the primordial truth of the experience is participatory rather than 
abstract, and ineluctable rather than demonstrable.47  
(c) Connecting with Hard Reality 
During much of our sojourn in the world, at least in the developed 
global North, the inflexible demands of hard reality are well in the 
background of our experience. We rarely test ourselves physically, and 
technology allows us to be remarkably sedentary and disconnected in our 
interactions with what Serres calls “hard” reality. Fewer and fewer of us—
and very few academics—really labor with our bodies. We are largely 
insulated from hunger; and we can opt to eat almost anything at almost any 
time, regardless of the season of the year or the bioregion in which we 
reside. The natural rhythms of summer and winter, day and night, and even 
youth and age, mean relatively little to us in terms of restricting our 
activities. Even people of relatively humble means live with conveniences 
and luxuries that far surpass those enjoyed by kings and emperors of old. 
I’m not suggesting all these developments are regrettable; but is it any 
wonder that we’ve become—in a felicitous turn of phrase given Serres’s 
work—soft? True, hard reality eventually wins out, as Derrida’s reality “as if 
we were dead” comes to pass all too soon; but prior to what Seneca calls 
“that ultimate necessity,” it is all too easy to fool ourselves into believing 
that we are the masters of reality rather than subject to it. 
In contrast, the sort of physical activity that elicits vitality is 
uncompromising in its honesty; it is a mode of engagement with the world 
that unfolds without distraction or subterfuge. We can be fooled by many 
things in the world, and we deceive ourselves about many more. But bend to 
lift a weight, whether a barbell or a sack of grain, and you will find that “two 
hundred pounds is always two hundred pounds.”48 There is an unflinching, 
merciless, direct honesty in the hard. This is the “iron law” of the “thing 
itself” and what it teaches us; “the thing itself… alone, commands [assent, 
rather than] opinion.”49 
This inflexibility has consequences, and forces us to accommodate 
ourselves to reality rather than the other way around. Take, by way of 
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illustration, the example with which I began. Traversing the Cathedral 
cirque, I was forced to accept, rather than alter, hard realities. Accept a long 
day with little food or water, rather than being able to consume anything 
that struck my fancy, whether or not I was hungry. Accept the weather—
bitter cold in the early morning darkness and intense, high-altitude sun with 
a strong, unpredictable wind in the afternoon—rather than easily adjusting 
the climate to my liking. And, most strikingly, forced to actually conform 
my body to hard reality in the act of ascending: a climber ascends rock by 
inserting fingers, hands, fists, or feet into cracks in the granite, employing a 
variety of techniques to torque, expand, or otherwise modify the shape of 
the limb to conform to the available space in the fissure. Here, the climber 
literally reshapes the body in order to accept what is given by hard reality; an 
act of carnal anamorphosis reveals a path upward that is utterly closed, 
invisible even, to those unwilling or unable to so adapt.50  
Finally, without intending to exaggerate or dramatize the situation, 
there were the hard realities of gravity and physics that I could not change, 
along with their potential repercussions. Consequences, Serres notes, are 
another distinction between the hard and the soft. In everyday life, 
increasingly characterized by softened forms of reality, things matter in a 
rather different way: “…a thousand things without importance are neither 
obligatory nor punished here. You do not have to pay for every detail of 
common life. A hundred spaces beyond the law let you do, say, or get 
through as you wish.”51 Soft realities compromise, forgive mistakes, and in 
general cushion the slings and arrows of fate; hard reality, however, 
punishes miscalculations and mistakes. When dealing with hard reality, we 
must remember that “minor causes” can have “great effects”: “beyond the 
port: shipwreck for the smallest error; once past the mountain hut: at the 
slightest mistake you will fall.”52 As a consequence, “you begin to live 
another way.”53  
And lest one be put off by the tendency to illustrate the consequences of 
hard reality with stereotypically “rugged” activities, Serres suggests that 
other examples conform to a similar rule: “higher mathematics, fine arts, 
high virtuosity, high-level mysticism, all correspond in every way to high 
mountains or the high seas, worlds where the cords [binding us to hard 
reality, to others, or both] remain taut.”54 This “correspondence” seems to be 
a consequence of the fact that such endeavors require the agent to conform 
or otherwise show deference to the inflexible aspects of reality, including 
certain inescapable consequences of failure. For example, just as one cannot 
fool oneself or others climbing—either you can ascend the pitch or you 
cannot—one cannot fake or deceive Ravel’s Jeux d’Eau or Prokofiev’s Piano 
Concerto No.2. Either you can play the piece or you cannot. 
So, vitality reveals our primary engagement with hard reality, before 
the softening of reflection, language, symbols, and narratives gets fully 
underway and accelerates.55 And it does not view hard reality abstractly—
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poetically, scientifically, or otherwise; it engages hard reality as directly as 
possible: carnally, sensuously, physically.  
(d) The Thinking Body  
Perhaps the most provocative insight to arise from careful reflection on 
vitality is that we must recognize the ways in which the body “thinks,” 
“knows,” “understands,” and, indeed, possesses a kind of “wisdom.” Such 
claims fly in the face of 2500 years of philosophy—at least in the West—
which insists that thinking is done with the mind, and done best precisely 
when freed from the distractions of the body. The body, insists Plato, is a 
“prison house” for the soul,56 and is an “obstacle when one associates with it 
in the search for knowledge.”57 But Chinese and Japanese philosophy have 
pursued the topic of a thinking or understanding body for thousands of 
years. And contemporary research in neurobiology and psychology 
supports this work, articulating the various ways in which the body chooses 
or acts prior to deliberation, or even conscious attention.58  
Vitality teaches us at least two important hermeneutic lessons: (1) that 
in certain circumstances success hinges on getting the mind out of the body’s 
way; and, (2) that the world is, on some basic level, worthy of our trust.59 
Let’s then conclude by briefly considering each of these. 
The first thing vitality teaches us is that the body knows and 
understands the world, and that, at least in some cases, bodily 
understanding is superior to rational understanding. As Serres suggests: 
“Go, run, faith will come to you, the body will sort things out.”60 But the 
body sorts things out best when the mind—analysis and conscious 
reflection—gets out of its way: “To inhabit your body better, forget it, at 
least in part….”61 In certain instances, insight or success hinges, pace Plato, on 
quieting the mind rather than escaping the body. The forgetfulness that 
Serres speaks of is not an escape from carnality, but rather a manner of being 
embodied that allows the body to act without the mind second-guessing or 
micro-managing the situation. True, bodily understanding can certainly err 
and it is not appropriate for all circumstances; but it is all-too-clear that 
reason can err as well, and there are contexts in which forgetting oneself and 
allowing the body to flow undeniably results in judgments that are both 
more swift and more accurate. A coup de corps, so to speak, rather than 
merely d’oeil. 
The most famous example of this with respect to wu-wei is the story of 
“Cook Ting” in the Chuang Tzu, one of the canonical texts of Taoism. Cook 
Ting is called on to butcher an ox, and does so with such marvelous skill and 
grace that all are astonished. Ting confesses that—because he does not 
actually cut, or hack, or otherwise force his will on the carcass, but rather 
inserts the blade following the natural spaces between the joints—his blades 
have not required sharpening for over nineteen years. He meets no 
resistance when performing his work, but “the flesh falls apart like a lump 
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of earth falling to the ground.”62 Here, and in more contemporary instances 
documented by Mihaly Ciskszentmihalyi and others, success flows from not 
over-thinking things, from letting the body act naturally. And such 
understanding has implications far beyond butchery or sport; as Lord Wen 
Hui exclaims after watching Cook Ting work, “I have learned how to live 
life fully.”63  
Ed Casey’s treatment of the “glance” offers us a parallel analysis.64 The 
glance embraces just the sort of pre-reflective understanding I have 
associated with vitality, albeit in what Casey recognizes as an oculo-centric 
mode. Casey—paralleling without mentioning Proust and Serres—
emphasizes the degree to which the glance reveals, precisely because of its 
openness and spontaneity, things that would not show up under the 
penetrating gaze of direct vision. This deference to the things that show 
themselves is not unlike Serres’s admiration for soothsayers and haruspices, 
which operate with an attitude of trust in the world prior to, as Casey has it, 
attempts to “penetrate the thing” or “go behind” it in a move of suspicion.65 
Thus, the second thing vitality teaches us is that the world is, to a 
significant degree, trustworthy. Here the foil for vitality would be 
overblown instances of “hermeneutics of suspicion” suggesting that our 
senses, our bodies, and reality itself are fundamentally untrustworthy and 
lead us to error. Suspicion, of course, has proved enormously productive, 
whether we look at scientific skepticism used to demand the replicability of 
experimental proof, or the work of Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud chipping 
away at accreted dogmatisms masquerading as objective fact. However, if 
all we do is tear things down, we will be left with precious little. The 
problem, as I’ve suggested elsewhere, is that certain strains of hermeneutics 
take “avoid error”—rather than “seek the truth”—to be the fundamental 
epistemological rule.66 And seeking to avoid error at all cost leads us to over-
value suspicion.  
Of course, suspicion per se is not the problem; the problem is when 
suspicion is elevated to the status of first, last, and only principle. The 
hermeneutics of suspicion is essential, whether applied to cultural traditions 
or sensuous engagement with the world. However, as Paul Ricoeur noted it 
must be supplemented by a hermeneutics of affirmation—not in a manner 
that suggests blind approval or naïveté, but rather as part of an ongoing 
negotiation between suspicion and affirmation, critique and conviction, so 
that each affirmation is a second (or third, or nth) naïveté that takes up 
affirmation in light of changes wrought by suspicion.  
Vitality—because it engages us with hard reality “directly”67 (i.e., prior 
to suspicion), and because that engagement is uncommonly penetrating and 
successful—reminds us that we should not entirely repudiate our initial 
trust in the world. It is true that our senses can and do deceive us; but for 
every instance of seeing stick “bend” when inserted in water, there are 
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innumerable instances of our senses operating perfectly well.68 Moreover, 
reason—lauded as that which corrects our supposedly unreliable senses—is 
fully capable of its own errors. Reason, in fact, often steers us wrong, acting 
like a lawyer or press secretary seeking to justify acts, opinions, or 
judgments ex post facto, rather than acting like an objective judge.69 That our 
primary sensuous engagement with the world is so regularly accurate, and 
that rational abstractions about the world are at least sometimes in error, 
should win for the world and for our bodies at least a measure of our trust.70 
Is this the “thinking body” or the “embodied mind”? It is both, of 
course. And while vitality is far from the only manifestation of this 
comingling of the carnal and the cognitive, it is one that offers particularly 
telling insights for a hermeneutics “beyond the metaphor of the text,” 
simultaneously reconnects us with the flesh of the body, the hardness of 
reality, and the fittedness of the one for the other.  
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